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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES HORNSBY,
Appellant-Plaintiff,
vs.
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
a Utah corporation sole,
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON,
and JOHN DOES I through X,
inclusive,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS CORPORATION
OF THE PRSIDING BISHOP OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS AND
CHARLES GIBLETT
Appeal From Third District
Court, Honorable Timothy Hanson
District Court Judge
No. C-83-5019
Utah Supreme Court
No. 860007

Respondents-Defendants.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued defendants for damages allegedly suffered
as the result of a motorcycle accident March 30, 1983 at approximate
7975 West 2820 South, Magna, Salt Lake County, Utah where plaintiff
Hornsby overturned his motorcycle in an effort to avoid a cow
that was crossing 2820 South from south to north (R. 890).
The accident occurred during daylight hours, in clear weather
and on a dry asphalt surface (R. 891). The heifer which belonged
to the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The LDS Church
had been pastured (R. 650) on the property of defendant John
Sutton for approximately thirty (30) days prior to the date
of the accident (R. 631), and on that date was being loaded
by defendants John Sutton and Charles Giblett, Church farmer,

into Sutton's horse trailer (R. 634) for the purpose of returning
it and another heifer to the Church property which was immediately
to the west and north of the Sutton property and from which
the two heifers had somehow gotten across the fences separating
the properties,

(R. 629, 630, 650, 673).

One heifer entered the horse trailer (R. 662, 691).
The second heifer threw its weight against the corral gate which
was attached to the horse trailer by a hook (R. 598) and by
four strands of baling wire (R. 658, 556) and was lodged behind
the frame of the trailer (R. 658, 660) with such force that
the animal "drove the gate right past the trailer" (R. 660)
got through the gate (R. 662) and crossed 2820 South street
in a southerly direction into a 30 acre field owned by Kennecott
Copper Corporation (R. 663). For about an hour (R. 643) Mr.
Giblett and two boys attempted to control the heifer in the
Kennecott pasture without success, finding the animal "wasn't
herdable" (R. 647), and just prior to the accident the heifer
went through what was described as the Haslam property (R. 643),
and onto 2820 South street Mr. Giblett being 150 to 200 feet
behind (R. 665). At approximately the same time plaintiff Hornsby
was returning to his home from his job at Kennecott taking an
indirect route (R. 938) and traveling in an easterly direction.
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John Sutton's daughter, Mary, had returned home from
work after the heifer had left the Sutton premises (R. 775)
and she in her car and her father in his truck (R. 561), drove
up and down 2820 South and 80th West with their blinker lights
flashing (R. 779, 584) in an effort to determine the location
of the heifer and to assist in its containment (R. 777). Just
prior to Mr. Hornsby's accident, Mary had stopped her automobile
on the south side of 2820 South approximately 165 feet from
the corner (R. 792) with the blinker lights flashing, both front
and back, went to look for the cow, ran back to the car when
she saw the cow coming (R. 780) and waved to Mr. Hornsby while
standing on the hardtop of the traffic lane (R. 782) intending
to warn him (R. 799) of the potential danger on the street from
the heifer.

Mary's view of the S curve was unobstructed (R.

797 and she watched Hornsby making the S turn and traveling
the 165 feet to her car.

(R. 793)

There is conflict in the

testimony as to whether Mary was outside the vehicle as she
testified (R. 791), or inside the vehicle, which was the testimony
of Hornsby (R. 921, 923).
Hornsby said his speed at the time of the accident was
approximately 30 m.p.h. (R. 926) although he had slowed to 15
to 20 m.p.h. (R. 935, 925) as he rounded the S curve just west
of the accident scene.

Mary Sutton said Hornsby was at or exceeded

the speed limit at the time he passed her (R. 799, 806). At
the time of the accident Hornsby was accelerating (R« 647) and
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acknowledges that he saw Mary Sutton waving her arms (R. 923)
but that he interpreted the signal to be a friendly greeting
rather than a warning of impending danger (R. 924).
The point where Hornsby laid down his motorcycle was
210 feet easterly from Mary Sutton's parked car (R. 798, 579).
After the accident/ while Hornsby was lying in the roadway he
made statements in the presence of witnesses to the effect that
he saw the girl waving but didn't understand what she wanted.
(R. 796, 802, 586)
The case was tried before a jury of eight persons (R.
329) (not seven as erroneously reported in appellant's brief)
over a period of four days.

In response to special interrogatories

the jury found no negligence on the part of any defendant but
determined that plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence
was the proximate cause of his injury (R. 334).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the position of these defendants that the case
was tried in an atmosphere of fairness and that the trial judge
carefully conducted the voir dire examination which resulted
in an unbiased jury.

The evidence established that there was

no departure from the standard of cattle loading within Salt
Lake County and that in an effort to contain the escaped heifer
defendants conducted themselves in a reasonably prudent manner
which included the stationing of one of the defendants on the
public road with the blinker lights on her vehicle flashing
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and with said defendant (Mary Sutton) waving her arms to warn
oncoming traffic.
to heed it.

Plaintiff Hornsby saw the warning but failed

The jury had to determine whether a reasonable

man would have misinterpreted the warning and found against
the plaintiff.
The religious affiliation of the jurors was not elicited
in the voir dire examination, the judge intentionally refusing
to do so.

Defendants were "in the dark" as to the religious

affiliation of the jurors as well as the plaintiff except for
the jury foreman, Mr. Alex C. Lucero, who reported on the voir
dire that he was an Assembly of God Minister (R. 958A).
defendants nor plaintiff struck him from the jury.

Neither

In a case

such as this where an animal belonging to a church was reputedly
the cause of an injury it is not incumbent upon the court to
determine of the prospective jurors membership or non-membership
in the defendant church.

As a matter of fact/ the mere determinatic

of membership in the LDS Church would leave unanswered many
other questions/ including the extent to which that person was
active in his church through his attendance at meetings/ his
payment of tithing or contributions, his holding of a temple
recommend or a variety of other indicia of activity.

These

defendants contend that it is not proper for a court, in a case
where religious doctrine or practices are not at issue, to inquire
of religious affiliation.

The voir dire question put the prospectiv

jurors as to whether their "feelings either pro or con with
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regard to the LDS Church would affect their ability to be fair
and impartial jurors" together with the remainder of the voir
dire as quoted in this brief constituted a fair and proper voir
dire examination with respect to bias and prejudice as a result
of religious affiliation.
The plaintiff contends that counsel for these defendants
improperly referred to the "welfare farm" during the trial.
There is no record before this court of any caution or warning
given to counsel by the court admonishing him to refrain from
such reference.

There was some discussion in chambers regarding

the reference to the Church defendant as "the Church" and all
counsel agreed that they would try to follow such admonition.
The judge observed that he, himself, might fall into the trap
and it became apparent throughout the trial that each counsel
inadvertently made such reference.

No Motion for Mistrial was

made nor did the court take occasion to further admonish counsel
either as to the use of the phrase "the Church" or the term
"welfare farm".
Plaintiff•s requested instructions to the jury contained
instructions with respect to res ipsa loquitur, negligence per
se, and strict liability.

Counsel for all defendants argued

that these instructions should not be given and the court refused
to give them.

The evidence during the trial had clearly established

that this was not a case for res ipsa loquitur, the sole Utah
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case on animals on the public highway (Rhiness v. Dansie, 24
Ut 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 [1970]) having determined that it was
plaintiff's burden to show that the animals got upon the public
highway through some specific act of negligence on the part
of the defendants.

The court had determined that plaintiff's

proof did not establish any negligence on the part of the defendant
Church which resulted in the heifer's being in Sutton's yard
approximately thirty (30) days prior to the accident and so
instructed the jury (Instruction No. 23) (R.365).

The case,

therefore, went to the jury on the issue of specific acts of
negligence on the part of the defendants.

Instruction No. 22

(R.363/ 364) (See Addendum I) fairly put before the jury the
acts of negligence complained of, to-wit; the negligent permitting
of a cow upon a public highway, the duty to use reasonable care
in loading as to prevent a cow from escaping, the duty to use
reasonable care in confining or capturing an escaped cow, the
duty to use reasonable care to warn motorists of the potential
danger of cattle coming onto the highway, and the duty of one
who voluntarily assists in attempting to warn motorists to use
reasonable care in so assisting.
The Utah statute (Title 10-10-3 U.C.A. 1953) making it
a misdemeanor "to stay, tether, herd, graze, or pasture, or
allow to run at large or cause to be staked, tethered, herded,
grazed or pastured, or allowed to run at large any cow, etc.
upon any public highway" was determined by the court to refer
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to an intentional or permissive act and was not determinative
of negligence in the case of "an escaped cow".

It is defendant's

position that they did not violate the statute in question under
the facts of this case, and that plaintiff received all he was
entitled to with respect to a proper jury instruction when the
court gave Instruction No. 22 (R. 363) which instructed the
jury that under the law of Utah "an owner of cattle or a person
controlling the possession of cattle shall not negligently permit
such cattle to be upon a public highway both sides of which
are adjoined by property which is separated from such highway
by a fence".

The jury found no such negligent conduct on the

part of any defendant.
Finally, the proposed instruction with respect to strict
liability has no place in this case because of the absence of
evidence that the cow had any propensity likely to cause injury.
In cases cited in this brief from other jurisdictions, the courts
have refused to invoke the doctrine of strict liability even
where animals "acted up", there having been no evidence of dangerous
propensities theretofore.
The finding of the jury that defendants were not negligent
and that plaintiff was negligent as he approached the escaped
cow, all determined by the jury within fifty (50) minutes of
their commencement of deliberation, is not evidence of bias,
prejudice, or an unfair trial.

Rather, it is evidence of the

-8-

failure on the part of the plaintiff to convince the jury that
the defendants had not acted "as reasonable men" at all times
material to this case and further to convince the jury that
plaintiff had acted "as a reasonable man" in his approach to
the scene of the accident.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR BY THE
TRIAL COURT JUDGE IN THE COURT'S VOIR DIRE
EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS REGARDING
POTENTIAL PARTIALITY DUE TO INVOLVEMENT WITH
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS.
Plaintiff cites Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore/ 143 A.2d 627, 631 (MD 1958) claiming that there is
reversible error when a court fails to allow voir dire questioning
of prospective jurors as to their religious affiliation.
has misinterpreted the case.

Plaintiff

In Caseyf supra at 631 the Court

of Appeals of Maryland said,
"the trial court ruled that the questions
submitted by the plaintiff would not be asked
because the effect, if not the intent, was to
inquire into the jurors1 religious affiliations,
which the court thought would be improper."
The court then said
"We do not say, or even intend to intimate,
that the court was required to propound the
precise questions submitted. The form of the
questions to be asked is clearly within the
sound discretion of the court. However, it
is clear that the only question propounded by
-9-

the court was not sufficient to determine
possible cause for disqualification by reason
of bias or prejudice or otherwise. The question
asked was in a form so general that it is likely
it did not sufficiently indicate to the panel
of jurors what possible bias or prejudice was being
probed.

If the [trial] court had deemed it necessary,
it could have continued to examine the jurors,
or any one of them, in the manner suggested
in Bryant v. State, supra. By so doing the
nature of the answer, if it disclosed cause
for disqualification, would not necessarily
have revealed the religious affiliation
of the juror who made answer, and whether the
juror was favorably or unfavorably disposed
toward the . . . church or toward an adherent
to its religious faith. Ld. at 631, 632.
The court sustained the trial court's notion that probing
into religious affiliation was not essential to precluding juror
bias based on religious affiliation.

The court simply held

that the trial court's only question on the matter was too general
and, therefore, not sufficient.
Plaintiff in the present case sought voir dire which
contained questions which were not necessary to the assurance
of impartiality.

Plaintiff claims he should have been allowed

to question the jury regarding the following questions raised
in his proposed voir dire (R. 325-328):
"38. Did any of you hold a position in the
L.D.S. Church such as Bishop or presiding
officer or counselor?
39.

Which stake was that in?

40.

Where is that located?
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41. Would that position affect you in making a
fair decision in this case?
42. If the evidence were favorable to the
plaintiff in this case, would you have a problem
in awarding a judgment against the L.D.S.
Church?
43. Are any of you members of the L.D.S.
Church?
44. Would that, in any way, affect your ability
to evaluate the evidence in this case and
render a fair decision for the plaintiff?
45. If the evidence is favorable for the
plaintiff in this case, would you have a
problem with entering a judgment against
the L.D.S. Church?"
In his brief at page 6, plaintiff claims he should also
be allowed to ask:
"Whether any attended the Oquirrh Stake from
where the cow came.
Whether any of them either volunteered at the
subject farm or knew persons who had or did."
As stated in Casey, supra, first, "the form of the questions
to be asked is clearly within the sound discretion of the court."
Secondly, it was the court's prerogative to ask the questions.
Thirdly, plaintiff cannot show that answers to his ten questions
would provide any greater assurance of impartiality than the
trial court's questions set forth hereinafter.
In Casey the court held that the trial court, in its
questions regarding bias due to religious affiliation, should
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have informed the prospective jurors of the parties, the nature
of the case, and who the real defendant was.

The court said

the trial court should then have propounded a question inquiring
if there was any reason why any juror could not arrive at a
fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence to be produced
and the law applicable to the case to be set forth.

Casey,

supra at 631.
The court in the present case (See R. 1023-1025) said:
" . . . Ladies and Gentlemen, there's a couple
of other questions I want to ask you. As you're
all aware, one of the Defendants in this case is
the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and
it's none of this Court's business, or anybody's
business what your religious preferences are. And
I intend to ask no questions in that regard. But
this is a civil matter; it's not a religious
matter. It doesn't have anything to do with
anybody's theories, or ideas, or beliefs with
regard to religion. But I want to make sure there
is no one on the jury who feels that they would
have difficulty serving as a juror because of any
strong feelings they may have one way or another
with regard to the LDS Church. So let me ask the
question this way: Are there any of you who feel
that you would have trouble being an impartial
juror because of feelings you may have either pro
or con with regard to the LDS Church that you
think might affect your ability to be a fair and
impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like you to
raise your hand.
The record will show that all members of the
jury have indicated that that would have no effect
on their decision one way or the other. All
parties, Ladies and Gentlemen, regardless of
whether they are a religion, or a business, or
what position an individual may hold in the commu-
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nity, are entitled to equal justice under our
system of law. And it's very important that all
members — parties receive a fair and impartial evaluation
of their rights and responsibilities/
and their conduct by a jury regardless of their
station in the community. You've all indicated
that you would do that.
Couple other general questions, Ladies and
Gentlemen. These are only questions that you can
answer by looking at your own state of mind, and
your own thoughts regarding things, because we
can't look into your mind. But let me ask you
this: Is there any reason that we have not yet
discussed — if we've already talked about it,
obviously we don't need to go over it again — is
there any reason we have not yet discussed that
you think might affect your ability to be a fair
and impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like
you to raise your hand. The record will show that
none of the prospective panel have so indicated.
Let me ask the same question another way. Ladies
and Gentlemen, if I can, if you were a party to
this suit, if you were the Plaintiff, Mr. Hornsby,
or if you were the Defendant, the LDS Church, or
Mr. Giblett or Mr. and Mrs. Sutton — Mr. and Ms.
Sutton, if you were a party to this lawsuit, and
knowing your own state of mind as potential jurors
in this case, are there any of you who would be
dissatisfied, or feel uncomfortable having a juror
of your like thinking at the present time sitting
in judgment of your case? In other words, would
you be satisfied if all eight jurors that were
going to decide your case had the same frame of
mind about things, and the same willingness, or
lack thereof, to follow the law on the facts, and
decide your case. If so, Ifd like you to raise
your hand if you would have difficulty with a
juror like yourself on your own jury if you were
here as a party.
The questions asked by the court clearly meet the criteria
in Casey and were clearly sufficient to probe bias based upon
religious affiliation.
Plaintiff further asserts at page 6 of his brief that
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"Because of the large LDS Church population, the
probability of a juror holding a position of
leadership in the Church is great. Therefore, it
was very likely that a juror would perceive that
plaintiff was suing 'my Church'."
A juror need not be an officer in a church to know whether
"his" church is a defendant.

Plaintiff implies by this statement

and by his proposed question number 38, supra, that the mere
holding of office in the LDS Church is sufficient to establish
bias in the officeholder serving as a juror.

His proposed question

number 43 supra, implies that mere membership in a church is
sufficient to establish bias.
Such an argument was rejected in State v. Kay, 475 P.2d
541 (Utah 1970).

In that case, the defendant appealed a lower

court's conviction in a criminal case where six of eight jurors
were members of the victim church and where each had satisfied
the trial court
"he would not be biased or prejudiced by virtue of
his church membership, nor would he give more or
less credit to a witness who was a member of the church."
idDefense counsel in that case argued,
"The unfairness of a Mormon sitting in judgment of
one charged with wrongdoing concerning his church
and his own property seems patently clear."

In affirming the lower court, the Utah Supreme Court declared,
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"This quoted language appears to be an indictment
of every Mormon that is so unspecific and sweeping
as to amount to what we consider to be an ecclesiastical non sequitur. It is an ipse dixit that
imputes to every Mormon, or for that matter, every
Catholic, every Protestant, and every Jew, ad
infinitum, a congenital, ingrained or adopted
dishonesty where his church's property and his own
property are involved. The leveling of such a
charge is as unorthodox and ungracious as the
charge itself. We cannot accept defendant's
premise on any legal, social, economic or
religious grounds."
A concurring opinion stated:
"The defendant's lawyer asserts that he can
represent the client fairly because he has taken
an oath as a lawyer to do so. It seems that he
refuses to ascribe to the jurors the same degree
of moral integrity which he arrogates unto
himself. Honesty should compel him to believe
that each juror would be mindful of his own oath
to render a just and true verdict according to the
law and the evidence."
Plaintiff cites State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984)
as holding that religious affiliation must be inquired into
in order to give him information desirable in exercising
peremptory challenges.
The court in State v. Ball, narrowly held that asking
a venireman whether his abstention from the drinking of alcohol
has a religious basis is not prohibited by the Utah constitution.
Id. at 1060.

The court stressed that "we do not examine the

scope of permissible grounds for a challenge for cause relating
to claimed bias solely by reason of a person's adherence to
specific religious beliefs . . . "
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The court also noted,

"Several state courts have expressed the view that
caution must be exercised to prevent the use of
peremptory challenges to accomplish covertly what
cannot be done overtly, namely, the denial of
equal protection to groups of prospective jurors
and of cross-sectionalism of juries to criminal
defendants. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148
Cal.Rptr. 890f 583 P.2d 748 (1978); State v.
Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980). See
also McCray v. Abrams, 576 F.Supp. 1244 9E.D.N.Y.
1983). That caution is appropriate and most
certainly formed part of the motivation for the
language in our constitution excluding religious
beliefs or the lack thereof as a ground for disqualification of jurors.

The gathering of sufficient relevant information
must, of course, be pursued with a sensitivity to
the privacy of the potential juror. The criminal
defendant's right to a fair trial does not create
a license in his defense counsel to conduct an
inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences of a venireman. The trial judge, in his
broad discretionary power to conduct voir dire,
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 60 (1982),
Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d
336, 341 (1979), has a duty to protect juror
privacy." JEd. at 1059, 1060
Plaintiff cites United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451
(10th Cir. 1985) with the apparent intent of showing that the
trial court's submission of a forty-four page questionnaire
to 116 potential jurors is authority for his own request.

The

Affleck court said the trial court included questions in its
questionnaire "about the person's religious affiliation."

No

mention is made as to the number or wording of the questions.
Even with the questionnaire and with oral voir dire by
both the court and by counsel of the 77 who were available for
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oral voir dire, only three potential jurors were dismissed for
expressing their opinion as to appellant's guilt.

There is

no indication that the results would have been otherwise without
the questionnaire.
The Affleck court also said:
"To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an
accused/ without moref is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality
would be to establish an impossible standard. It
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based
on the evidence presented in the court." Ic[. at 1455.
Plaintiff argues that reference to the words "stake president
"church relationship", and "brethren" during the trial was inherentl
prejudicial.

Plaintiff fails to explain how or why such use

of the common identifying vernacular would cause or force a
juror to abandon impartiality.
Plaintiff argues that jury deliberation of fifty minutes
is sufficient to infer prejudice.

Plaintiff fails to show any

authoritative basis for such inference.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL
TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS "THE WELFARE FARM.
Plaintiff claims the record shows defense counsel used
the term "welfare" in violation of a prior order of the court
not to do so.
that claim.

Neither the citations given nor the record support

Nevertheless, defense counsel's use of the term

"welfare farm" would not constitute prejudicial reference to
-17-

the defendant as a "welfare" institution and is not grounds
for reversible error.
If the term "welfare" was used by counsel to describe
the farm in question by its commonly known public designation
there could be no misconduct.

The term "welfare farm" can evoke

a variety of images in the minds of jurors according to their
individual experiences.

The word "welfare", does not necessarily

portray a picture of a "penniless defendant".

It is unlikely

that people in this State would accept such a picture.

Utah

jurors are drawn from areas where the term "welfare farm" is
of common usage.

Its use likely evokes an image of a Church

property where LDS members go to help produce commodities to
assist the needy.
If plaintiff believed the use of the term "welfare farm"
evoked an image in the mind of any juror which did or could
cause that juror to abandon impartiality, counsel should have
objected or made a motion for a mistrial.

No objection or motion

was made.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION
ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
Plaintiff's brief fails to cite the only Utah Supreme
Court case on the subject of res ipsa loquitur as it applies
to escaped animals on the public highway.
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In Rhiness v. Dansie,

supra this court dealt with an automobile-horse collision in
Spanish Fork Canyon.

The plaintiffs in that case had been unable

to establish any specific act of negligence and at the conclusion
of their evidence the trial judge granted defendant's Motion
for a directed verdict.

Title 41-6-38 U.C.A. 1953 (See Addendum

II) provided that:
"No person owning . . . any livestock, shall
. . . negligently permit any such livestock
to stray upon . . . a public highway, both
sides of which are adjoined by property which
is separated from such highway by a fence, wall,
hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn or building;
. . . In any civil action brought by the owner,
driver or occupant of a motor vehicle . . .
where damages caused by collision with any domestic
animal or animals on a highway, there is no
presumption that such collision was due to
negligence on behalf of the owner . . .
of such livestock."
This court held that:
"In order for the plaintiffs to recover in this
action, they must show two things: first,
that the highway was fenced on both sides; and
second, that the horses got upon the highway
through the negligence of the defendant.
The mere fact that the animals escaped from
the enclosure is not sufficient evidence
standing alone, to justify the submission
of defendant's negligence to the jury."
The quoted section from Title 41 is still the statutory
law of the State of Utah.

Both the statute and the Rhiness

case clearly negate the notion that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply in this state in connection with cattle
on the public roads.

The Oregon case of Watzig v. Tobin 642
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P.2d 651 (1982) cited by plaintiff which appears to approve
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applicable to cattle on
the public highway, can be readily distinguished on its facts.
In that case7 the evidence did not establish how the cow had
escaped its enclosure.

In the instant case the manner in which

the cow escaped was clearly established by the testimony.

The

issue that was placed before the jury had to do with the loading
practice of the defendants and whether that loading practice
met the standard as demonstrated by what reasonable men as cattle
loaders did within Salt Lake County.

In Watzig, it was held

that for the purposes of that case, the only element of res
ipsa loquitur which must be proved is that "the accident must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence" (specifically eliminating two other
elements of res ipsa loquitur which had previously appeared
in Oregon cases).

The court stated at page 655:

"The conclusion which must be drawn to render
the doctrine applicable is not whether
a cov/ can escape such an enclosure, but
rather whether a jury could reasonably find, under
the evidence, that it is more probable than not
that the escape of the cows would not normally
occur in the absence of negligence and that
the negligence was that of the defendants."
Such mental gymnastics need not be indulged where it is known
how the cow escaped and the facts regarding the loading procedure
are presented in detail as in the instant case.
court further observed at page 656:
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The Oregon

"Although we do not hold that res ipsa
loquitur applies to every case in which a cow
escapes from an enclosed area and enters
a public highway, under the facts of this
case, a jury could conclude that the cows
would not have escaped in the absence of
negligence and that negligence which caused
their escape was that of the defendants.
Res ipsa loquitur was applicable."
The above wording indicates that the applicability in
cattle cases of res ipsa loquitur in Oregon, was limited to
the facts of the Watzig case.
Plaintiff cites the recent case of Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel
Corporation, 681 P.2d 1232 (Ut., 1984) as authority for the
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

In that

case it was observed that the "plaintiff cannot point to an
individual event or practice of defendants that produced the
defective condition in the particular pallet that broke and
caused this accident".

The court further stated:

"At the second trial, the court must decide
if a res ipsa instruction is appropriate on
the basis of the evidence submitted there.
Assuming plaintiff can prove that the pallet
broke and caused his fall, but cannot point
to the specific act that caused the pallet to
break, a res ipsa instruction could be appropriate.
However, if the evidence goes so far as to
explain the precise cause of the break, res
ipsa is no longer necessary and therefore
would be inappropriate, (citing cases)"
The Utah court adopted language from the Kansas decision
Ballhorst v. Honor-Foreman-Caley, Inc., 207 Kan. 89, 484 P.2d
38 as follows:
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"We further (hold) that res ipsa loquitur
should not be removed by proof of specific
negligence unless the proof goes so far as
to fully explain the cause of the injury
by positive evidence revealing all of the
facts and circumstances."
It is submitted that in the instant case the evidence
did go far enough to explain the cause of the injury by positive
evidence revealing all of the facts and circumstances.
It is interesting in the discussion of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur in Kusy/ supra/ that this court requires as
elements of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur the following:
"(1) That the accident was of a kind which, in
the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed; (2)
that the plaintiff's own use or operation of
the agency or instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the injury; and (3) that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury
was under the exclusive management or control
of the defendant."
It cannot be said in the instant case that the cow escaping
from the enclosure was primarily responsible for plaintifffs
injury in view of the evidence of plaintiff's inattention to
the warning of Mary Sutton and his accelerating his motorcycle
as he passed the warning vehicle, nor can it be shown that the
escaped cow was "an agency or instrumentality causing the injury"
under the exclusive management or control of the defendant when
plaintiff proceeded, as the evidence disclosed, past a warning
individual and vehicle into the path of the cow.
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In support of defendants1 position that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable is the case of Brauner
v, Peterson/ 16 Wash. App. 531, 557 P.2d 359 (1976).

The Washington

Court stated at page 361:
"With regard to res ipsa loquitur, the presence
of an animal at large on the highway is not
sufficient to warrant application of the rule,
i.e., the event must be of a kind not ordinarily
occurring in the absence of someone's negligence. A cow can readily escape from perfectly
adequate confines (citing Wilson v. Rule, 169
Kansas 296, 219 P.2d 690 [1950]). Thus, the
first of the three elements essential for application of res ipsa loquitur is not present.11
In the case of Tapia v. McKenzie, 85 N.M. 567 514 P.2d
618 (1973), the New Mexico court stated:
"Because plaintiff's case was grounded on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur he had the burden
of proving the two elements necessary to its
application: (1) that the cow (the instrumentality in this case) was under the exclusive
control of the defendants; and (2) that this
accident was of the type which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of negligence (Mitchell
v. Ridgeway, 77 NM 249, 421 P.2d 778 (1966).
Mere proof of the occurrence of an accident
is not sufficient to invoke the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. Renfro v. J.D. Coggins
Co. 71 NM 310, 378 P.2d 130 (1963).
The evidence adduced in support of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is substantially similar to
the evidence developed in Akin v. Berkshire (NM
Ct. of App.) 512 P.2d 1261, decided July 18,
1973. We held there that while there was no
question that the cow was under the exclusive
control of the defendant, plaintiff had not
shown that the cow-car accident in that case
was 'of the type which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of negligence'. Likewise,
plaintiff here has not sustained his burden
of proof on this element."
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The case of Barnes v. Frank 472 P.2d 745 (Ct. of App.
Col., 1970) developed out of a collision between an automobile
in which plaintiff was riding and animals on the highway owned
by defendant.

The animals had been kept in a field adjoining

the highway, enclosed within the confines of an electric fence.
Plaintiff had alleged that the defendant "negligently allowed
several of his cattle to escape onto and remain on a public
highway".

At the pre-trial the plaintiffs had stated that they

were unable to specify the particular negligent act of the defendant
which allowed the cattle to escape but that under the circumstances
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable and that the
burden is on the defendant to satisfy the jury that he was not,
considering all the circumstances, negligent in allowing the
cattle to escape".

At the trial the plaintifffs counsel conceded

that plaintiff was unable at this time and did not anticipate
being able to specify the particular negligent act of the defendant
which allowed the cattle to escape.

The trial court dismissed

the action on the ground that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was not applicable.

The court of appeals affirmed stating that:

"For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to be applicable it must appear (1) that
the instrumentality is under the exclusive
control of defendant, (2) that the accident
is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of defendant's negligence,
and (3) that it must not have been due to
any voluntary act or contribution on the
part of the plaintiff.
Applying these standards to the present
situation, it is clear that the requirement
of (2) above is not satisfied.
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The fact that the cattle were on the highway
does not in and of itself make defendant
liable or raise a presumption of negligence
against the defendant* The cattle may
have entered on the highway because of
any number of factors, including possible
acts of third persons. The duty rests
upon plaintiff to prove defendant was negligent
by a preponderance of the evidence. When
the plaintiff stated to the court in circumstances such as we have here that she
'will not present evidence of any specific
act of negligence on the part of the defendant1
the court has no alternative but to dismiss
her complaint."
In Reed v. Molnar, 67 Ohio St. 2d 76, 423 NE 2d 140 (Ohio,
1981) the Ohio Supreme Court held that:
"(1) Cattle owners could not be held strictly liable
in tort;
(2) Although statute prohibits one from
permitting domestic animals to run at large on
a public way, doctrine of negligence per se
was not applicable;
(3)

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.11

We will refer to this case in our argument respecting negligence
per se hereafter, but on the issue of res ipsa loquitur the
Ohio Court stated:
"To warrant application of the rule
a plaintiff must adduce evidence in
support of two conclusions (1) that the
instrumentality causing the injury was, at the
time of the injury, or at the time of the creation
of the condition causing the injury, under the
exclusive management and control of the defendants; and (2) that the injury occurred under
such circumstances that in the ordinary course
of events it would not have occurred if ordinary
care had been observed, (citing cases)
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A division of authority exists on the question
of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to
animal escape cases. Without passing on the
first branch of the foregoing test we find
that it may not be said that the presence of
unattended cattle on the public highway is
an occurrence that would not have materialized
absent someone's negligence. Thus, the doctrine
is inapplicable and appellants were not prejudiced
by the trial courts refusal to instruct the jury
on res ipsa loquitur.
In coming to this conclusion we are not
unmindful of the legislative recognition
implicit in R.C. 951.09 that animals may
escape without fault or negligence of their
owners. Similarly, there has been judicial
recognition that cattle and other domestic
animals can escape from perfectly adequate
confines (Wilson v. Rule, supra and
Barnes v. Frank, supra)."
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTIO
ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE.
The argument heretofore made with respect to the applicabilit
of the Utah case law (Rhiness v. Dansie, supra) and the statute
cited, Title 41-6-38 U.C.A. (1953), applies equally to the theory
of negligence per se.

Utah law is clear that a person is not

negligent merely because animals owned by him or in his possession
are "unattended on the highway".

There is a distinction between

herding or "allowing an animal to run at large" and the fact
situation in the instant case where an animal had escaped its
enclosure and was neither being "herded" or "allowed to run
at large" in the sense of the wording of the state statute or
county ordinance.

In Reed v. Molnar, supra the Ohio court treated

the applicability of three statutes.

-26-

R.C. 951.02 provided:

"A person, firm, or corporation which is the
owner or has charge of horses, mules, cattle,
sheep, goats, swine, dogs or geese, shall
not permit them to run at large in the public
road, highway, street, lane, or alley or upon
unenclosed land. . . . The running at large of
any such animal in or upon any of the places
mentioned in this section is prima-facie evidence
that it is running at large in violation of this
section.11
R.C. 951.09 provided in part:
"It is a sufficient defense to such prosecution
(for violation of 951.02) to show that the animal
was at large without the knowledge or fault of
its owner or keeper."
R.C. 951.10 provided in part:
"The owner or keeper of an animal described in
section 951.02 of the revised code, who permits
it to run at large in violation of such section
is liable for all damages caused by such
animal upon the premises of another without
reference to the fence which may enclose such
premises. . . . " (emphasis added)
The Ohio court stated:
"Where there exists a legislative enactment
commanding or prohibiting for the safety of
others the doing of a specific act and there
is a violation of such enactment solely by
one whose duty it is to obey it, such violation
constitutes negligence per se; but where there
exists a legislative enactment expressing for
the safety of others, terms, a rule of
conduct, negligence per se has no application
and liability must be determined by the
application of the test of due care as
exercised by a reasonably prudent person
under the circumstances of the case. (Eisenhuth
v. Moneyhom [1954] 161 Ohio St. 367,
119 NE 2d 440, paragraph 3 of the syllabus)
(emphasis added)
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Where a statute imposes a specific requirement
or duty, the jury need only determine whether
a prohibited act was committed or a required
act was omitted, to find the violator of the
statute negligent per se. But where duties
are defined (in the statute) or are defined only
in abstract or general terms, leaving to the
jury the ascertainment and determination of
reasonableness and correctness of acts and
conduct under the proven conditions and circumstances, the phrase negligence per se has no
application.11 (Swoboda v. Brown, (1935) 129 Ohio St.
512, 523, 196 NE 274)
The court concluded:
"The statute did not impose a requirement
of an absolute and specific nature justifying
application of the doctrine of negligence
per se. The statute prohibits the owner
or keeper of certain domestic animals,
including cattle from 'permitting1 such
animals to run at large on public highways."
34 ALR 2d 1285, at 1289 the court stated:
"Where the particular statute involved provides
that the owner shall not 'permit . . . his
animals to run at large1, the courts have
generally held, or recognized, that statutes of
this type are not violated in the absence of
at least negligence by the owner of the animals."
(emphasis added)
In the case of McCullough v. Gatch 161 SE 2d 182 (S.C.
1968) the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined that the
mere presence on the highway of an unattended cow with which
an automobile collided was insufficient to support a conclusion
that there had been a violation of a statute providing that
"it is unlawful for the owner or manager of any domestic animal
of any description willfully or negligently to prevent any such
animal to run at large beyond the limits of his own land," where
there was no evidence that the defendant had been guilty of
any negligent act or omission.
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A South Carolina statute Section 6-311, Code of 1962
provided:
"It shall be unlawful for the owner or manager
of any domestic animal of any description willfully or negligently to permit any such animal
to run at large beyond the limits of his own
land or the lands leased, occupied or controlled
by him. Any owner, manager, or person violating
the provisions of this section shall be subject
to a fine for each offense of not more than
$25.00 or to imprisonment for not more than 25
days."
Commenting upon this statute the Court stated:
"It is at once apparent that this statute does
not impose an absolute duty to prevent the
escape of livestock from the owner's custody
and control. At least negligence in permitting
the animals to stray is of the essence of the
proscribed conduct. Some evidence from which
an inference of such negligence may be drawn
is required. The mere presence of unattended
animals on a highway is insufficient to support
a conclusion that the statute has been violated."
The court further stated:
"For decisions from other jurisdictions involving
statutes, of varying verbiage, making it unlawful
to permit livestock to run at large, see
annotation 34 ALR 2d 1285. Concerning statutes
of similar tenure to ours, the annotator says at
page 1291: 'Authority is hardly required to
support the proposition that negligence is a
minimum prerequisite to liability under statutes
prohibiting the owner of domestic animals from
willfully (knowingly, voluntarily) or negligently
permitting such animals to run at large."
POINT V
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE
AN INSTRUCTION ON STRICT LIABILITY.
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Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 15 (Addendum 6
of Appellant's Brief) was refused by the trial judge.

The instructic

talks about propensities likely to cause injury and knowledge,
and awareness by the owner of such dangerous propensities.
The evidence in this case did not justify such an instruction
to the jury.

There was no evidence that the heifer had a dangerous

propensity which could cause harm nor that it was in any sense
a "renegade" cow (as described in plaintiff's brief).

The evidence,

on the contrary was to the effect that none of defendants had
notice that there was anything unusual or dangerous about this
heifer only that it was excited as it was being loaded which
was common to cattle during loading operations (R.633, 550).
The fact that it had previously gotten into defendant Sutton's
property from the Church property (along with another heifer
that was safely loaded into the horse trailer) was not sufficient
to submit this issue of "dangerous propensity" to the jury.
Further, the evidence with respect to the loading of the heifer
from all witnesses at the scene negated any notion that this
particular heifer was unusual or hard to control.

The heifer

had been contained for approximately one month in Sutton's pasture
and had not been returned to the Church property for the reason
that such activity might affect Sutton's cattle some of which
were carrying calves, and not for any reason involving the heifer
in question.
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The case of Vigue v. Noyes, 536 P. 2d 713, 24 Az. App.
144 vacated in part 550 P.2d 234, 113 Ariz. 237 (1976) cited
by plaintiff, held that:
"If a person who harbors or possesses domestic
animals likely to do harm unless controlled,
does not have reason to know that the animal
is abnormally dangerous, such person is
liable for harm done by the animal only
if harm is of a sort which is normal for
animals of its class to do, and if the
person fails to exercise reasonable care
to confine or otherwise control the animal.11
In the instant case there was no evidence that defendants had
reason to know of any dangerous propensity of the heifer.
In Macho v. Mahowald, 374 NW 2d 312 Ct. of App. Minn.
(1985) the plaintiff sought damages for an injury sustained
when he fell off defendant's horse which bolted immediately
after he mounted it.

The jury found plaintiff 40% negligent

and the defendant 60% negligent.

The trial court entered judgment

notwithstanding the verdict finding that the facts were insufficient
to place defendant on notice that the horse had a dangerous
propensity.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case because
the appellate court disagreed with the trial court that a prior
incident was insufficient to indicate a dangerous or vicious
propensity.

There had been one previous incident in which defendant

daughter had been riding the horse and it broke into a run and
she jumped or fell off.

Defendant believed that the horse wanted

to run to an adjacent alfalfa field at the time of that incident.
The appellate court held that:
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"The previous incident was the kind of evidence
from which the jury could have found that the
horse had a propensity to be dangerous (citing
cases)."
In the instant case there is no evidenct of such a previous
incident.

In Macho there was a dissent in which Judge Sedgwick

agreed with the trial court that "the one incident did not give
rise to a duty to warn.

Absent this duty there was no negligence."

The dissent quoted Vigue v. Noyes (supra) where an unattended
horse kicked a child in the head in a corral.

The Arizona court

found that the fact that the horse damaged his stall by kicking
flies, ate well, occasionally 'crow hopped1 (stopped suddenly
with stiff front legs) causing the rider to slide, and acted
'funny1 on the day of the accident did not establish viciousness."
The dissenting judge quoted other cases from Washington and
New York in a similar vein.
In the case of Flynn v. Lindfield, 6 Ariz. App. 459,
433 P.2d 639 (1967) cited by plaintiff, a 15 year old girl employed
as a baby sitter at a country home or ranch where livestock
was kept was injured in an encounter with a mare.

The Arizona

court commented upon the theory of strict liability and particularly
a previous incident which plaintiff claimed put the defendant
on notice of the dangerous propensity of the mare in question.
The court stated:
"It is the law in Arizona that any person who
keeps or harbors a domestic animal with
knowledge of its vicious tendencies or propensities
is liable in damages to another for any injury
caused by it unless it is shown that the
injured person, with knowledge of its
viciousness, did something to such animal
which caused it to injure him (citing cases).
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The determinative factor here is knowledge or
vicious propensities, and this question must
be viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Sarti v. Udall, 91 Az. 24,
369 P.2d 92 (1962) Here there was evidence
that approximately three weeks before the
plaintiff's injury, while the mare was being
loaded on a horse trailer, the animal jumped
out and f took a couple of swings' at one of the
persons handling her, . . . 'reared up and
came down on him' and in going over the side
of the trailer 'cut her chest all up 1 . There
is nothing in the record indicating that the
defendants did not know of any dangerous
propensities in this mare other than the
testimony of the plaintiff herself who said that
on previous occasions she and the children had
been into the corral to visit the animal
and had petted the colt without any adverse
reaction from its mother.
We see no basis of recovery here under a
strict liability theory because of the natural
tendency of a mare to protect her colt.
This is a normal hazard connected with the
raising of a commonly kept domestic animal
and gives rise to no special liability though the
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others
from the normal characteristics of such an
animals obtains.
(citing Restatement of Torts Section 509,
Comment E at 20)"
The court went on to explain, however, that:
"it has been held that even one 'previous
incident* is sufficient to take a case to
the jury under the doctrine of harboring
an animal with 'vicious propensities'.
Walter v. Southern Arizona School for Boys,
77 Az. 141, 145, 267 P.2d 1076, 1080 (1954).
Whether the one incident of misconduct on the
part of the mare which was witnessed by the
plaintiff is sufficiently 'vicious' to meet
this test, we do not pass upon, because of
the procedural posture of this case." (emphasis
added)
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Thus, the Flynn case does not make a determination one
way or the other as to whether one incident of misconduct was
sufficient to meet the "vicious propensity" test.

In any event,

where is the incident of misconduct in the instant case?
It is submitted that there is no statute or case law
in Utah to the effect that cattle are ferocious animals by nature.
In the absence of any prior incident from which a jury could
determine that defendants had actual notice of a vicious propensity
in the particular heifer, it was proper for the trial court
to refuse an instruction on strict liability.
CONCLUSION
These defendants contend that the voir dire examination
by the court of the prospective jurors in this case was thorough
and proper and resulted in an unbiased jury.

Defendants further

submit that it would have been improper for the trial judge
to inquire into the religious affiliation of the prospective
jurors in this type of case where the doctrines or practices
of the LDS Church were not an issue.

There was no improper

conduct on the part of counsel for these defendants.

The requested

jury instructions on the issues of res ipsa loquitur, negligence
per se and strict liability were properly refused under the
facts of this case.

Plaintiff was given a fair trial under

instructions permitting the jury to find any or all of the defendant
negligent in their conduct in loading the cattle, attempting
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to contain the heifer after it escaped, and in the manner of
giving warning to oncoming traffic.

The jury decided that defendants

were non-negligent but that plaintiff was negligent in his approach
to the accident scene.

The judgment of the trial court based

upon the special verdict should be affirmed.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

V^

You are instructed that the law in Utah requires
that an owner of cattle or a person controlling the possession
of cattle shall not negligently permit such cattle to be upon
a public highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property
which is separated from such highway by a fence; however, even
where cattle or a cow has come onto the highway from a fenced
area, there is no presumption that such occurred due to the
negligence of the owner or a person controlling the possession
of the cattle or a cow.
As this law applies to this case you are instructed
that the defendants Charles Giblett and John Sutton had a duty
to use reasonable care in loading the cattle or cow so as to
prevent the cattle or cow from escaping and further that once
the cattle or cow escaped, defendants Charles Giblett and John
Sutton had a duty to use reasonable care to capture or confine
said cattle or cow and in doing so to use reasonable care to
warn motorists of the potential danger of the cattle or the
cow coming onto the highway.
Although defendant Mary Sutton initially had no
duty to assist the other defendants in attempting to warn
motorists, once defendant Mary Sutton voluntarily rendered her
services in attempting to warn motorists, she had a duty to
exercise reasonable care to warn motorists of the potential
danger of the cattle or cow coming onto the highway.
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Although there is no presumption that any of the
defendants were negligent merely because an accident occurred
involving a near collision between plaintiffs motorcycle and
the cattle or cow that had come onto and was upon the highway
at the time of the accident in question, if you find that any
of the defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in
carrying out these duties and if you further find that the
plaintiff James Hornsby was required to lay down his motorcycle
because of such failure of the defendants, then you could find
that the defendants were negligent.
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ADDENDUM II
Utah Code 1985-1986/ Title 41-6-38
Livestock on Highway - Collison/ Action for Damages.
No person owning or controlling the possession of any
livestock, shall willfully or negligently permit any such livestock
to stray upon or remain unaccompanied by a person in charge
or control thereof upon a public highway, both sides of which
are adjoined by property which is separated from such highway
by a fence, wall/ hedge, sidewalk/ curb/ lawn or building; provided/
that the foregoing provision shall not apply to range stock
drifting into any such highway in going to or returning from
their accustomed ranges. No person shall drive any such livestock
uponf over or across any public highway during the period from
half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without
keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning lights on
continual duty to open the road so as to permit the passage
of vehicles. In any civil action brought by the owner, driver
or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their personal representative
or assignees/ or by the owner of the livestock for damages caused
by collision with any domestic animal or animals on a highway,
there is no presumption that such collision was due to negligence
on behalf of the owner or the person in possession of such livestock
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